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Abstract—Distributed Ledger Technologies (DLTs) (the agnos-
tic term for blockchain) are a potential solution for many pressing
issues arising in the Internet of Things (IoT) domain. These
issues include facilitating secure transactions between IoT devices
and immutably recording data. Most DLT architectures were not
designed with IoT in mind and consequentially do not satisfy the
requirements of many IoT applications. However, the relatively
new class of Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) based DLTs show great
promise for IoT networks. These DLTs require the rate at which
transactions are issued and disseminated to be explicitly managed
in order to ensure fairness among users. We present a congestion
control algorithm for these DLTs, which optimises dissemination
rate and guarantees that all nodes receive the same information
and have fair access even in a dishonest environment, subject to the
computing limitations of nodes. Our algorithm takes inspiration
from well-known areas of networking research, such as QoS, and
TCP. However, an important distinction between the DLT setting
and traditional networks is the unique nature of traffic in DLT
networks and the fact that nodes cannot trust familiar feedback
measurements, such as packet acknowledgements or congestion
notifications. Our solution realises a decentralised congestion
control algorithm for DLTs without the need for trust among
nodes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming increasingly preva-
lent in both industrial and academic communities. IoT devices
are now ubiquitous, including smart home and personal devices,
a vast array of urban and industrial sensors, and increasingly
intelligent vehicles. Many of these IoT devices must conduct se-
cure financial transactions, such as machine (M2M) payments,
and immutably record data. Blockchain and, more generally,
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) has been proposed to
facilitate such interactions. DLTs represent an attractive alter-
native to centralised services amid mounting concerns about
privacy and data integrity from the public, following recent data
controversies1. A further concern is around the emergence of
monopolies in certain domains. However, despite their great
promise, many DLT architectures are incapable of providing
a service comparable to centralised alternatives, due to either
security concerns or their ability to scale to the large number
of nodes and high transaction rate that would be required in the
IoT setting.
A DLT architecture is a trustless peer-to-peer (P2P) network
where nodes store a local copy of a database called a ledger.
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A fundamental property of DLTs is that nodes must reach
consensus on the state of the ledger without the aid of a central
entity. Here, trustless means that nodes do not need to trust
any other individual node, but must only trust that the system
as a whole is functioning correctly. The first generation of
DLTs were blockchains, such as Bitcoin [1], but these DLTs
are unsuitable for IoT environments for several reasons [2]. In
particular, the ledger in a blockchain is stored in blocks, each
one cryptographically linked to the previous one. The longest
chain contains the correct blocks, and new blocks should be
added to this chain. However, due to network delays, if several
blocks are created at the same time, multiple chains could have
the same length, and only one can become part of the ledger.
Therefore, blocks should only be created one at a time, and the
time between blocks should be reasonably large, at least greater
than the network delay. This process is too slow and inefficient
for IoT devices. Moreover, only so many nodes can regularly
create blocks, and so small IoT devices would have to rely on
larger, more centralised nodes to add information to the ledger.
Recently, interesting new DLT architectures have emerged
which generalise the blockchain structure. Specifically, we
refer to Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) based DLTs, in which
transactions are added to the ledger individually rather than
in blocks. Each new transaction is cryptographically linked
to two or more existing transactions. As a result, nodes can
write transactions simultaneously, and therefore, there is no
implicit throughput limit, as with blockchain counterparts.
However, a DAG based DLT requires congestion control since
the nodes have constrained resources. Specifically, network
resources must be allocated to nodes based on their possession
of a cryptographically verifiable resource. In blockchains like
Bitcoin, this resource is computing power, which is typically
limited in IoT devices. Alternatively, the proportion of resources
allocated to a node can be proportional to an uninflatable
number which we will call reputation.
A. Problem Statement
We propose a reputation based congestion control algo-
rithm for DLTs which require throughput of transactions to be
explicitly managed, such as the aforementioned DAG based
DLT. Each node must validate each transaction, add it to
the ledger, and then run some consensus algorithm. We call
this bottleneck writing. The specifics of writing will vary
across DLT implementations and may even vary from node to
node. For example, in certain DLTs some nodes may do the
most computationally heavy tasks, while other limited nodes,
like IoT devices, perform lighter tasks while writing. Without
congestion control, unwritten transactions could accumulate in
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
07
77
8v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 15
 M
ay
 20
20
queues causing delays and discrepancies between nodes’ local
ledgers. Moreover, overwhelmed nodes may drop transactions,
potentially causing inconsistencies in the ledger.
Our congestion control algorithm seeks to maximise
throughput subject to the writing bottleneck, while minimising
delays and satisfying the following requirements:
• Consistency: If a transaction is written by one correct
node, it should be written by all correct nodes, within
some delay bound.
• Fairness: All nodes should get a fair share of through-
put, achieving max-min fairness in the number of
transactions issued by each node during congestion,
weighted by an node’s reputation [3].
• Security: Malicious nodes should be unable to interfere
with either of the above requirements.
B. Specific Contributions
Following a brief summary of related work, in Section II,
we contribute the following.
• In Section III, we provide a node model capturing the
main bottleneck of writing transactions.
• In Section IV, we propose a congestion control al-
gorithm for DAG-based distributed ledgers, which is
also applicable to any distributed database replication
architecture with the requirements listed above. The
algorithm has two core components: a scheduling algo-
rithm which ensures fair access for all nodes according
to their reputation; a TCP-inspired algorithm for de-
centralised rate setting to utilise the bottleneck while
preventing delays.
• In Section V we describe a simulator which we built
to test our algorithm, and provide simulation results
which demonstrate that the algorithm satisfies our re-
quirements.
• In Section VI, we summarise our results and propose
directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Placing this work in the context of the existing literature
is challenging, as congestion control for DLTs lies at the
intersection of DLTs, and many topics within the networking
community, such as Quality of Service (QoS), TCP, network
security, gossip protocols, and many more. Specifically, our
solution employs a scheduler, and a decentralised rate setting
algorithm, so we discuss some instances of these in the net-
working literature. A similar algorithm, in spirit, to the one
proposed in this paper, but unsuitable for our requirements,
can be found in [4], in which the authors analyse a number
of epidemic algorithms and present a ‘flow control’ algorithm
for a replicated database. Their algorithm addresses how nodes
should adaptively control their update rate to avoid backlogs.
However, the algorithm in [4] is unsuitable for the trustless DLT
setting for the following reasons: firstly, congestion is detected
by overflows of updates in the buffer, which could result in
inconsistency across nodes; additionally, fairness is achieved in
[4] through communication and agreement with neighbouring
nodes, which is not a reasonable assumption in our trustless
setting. Our problem is also closely linked to resource manage-
ment in a number of network architectures, but our DLT setting
presents new challenges, as well as opportunities. Namely,
our DLT setting does not permit the assumption of trusted
communication between nodes, rendering traditional means of
detecting congestion, such as acknowledgements, vulnerable to
attack.
From the perspective of achieving QoS in IP networks, the
well-known differentiated services (DiffServ) [5] and integrated
services (IntServ) [6] architectures offer opposing approaches:
DiffServ offering approximate, but scalable and interoperable
differentiated treatment of traffic; IntServ permitting more pre-
cise, though less scalable, control through explicit reservation of
network resources. These solutions rely heavily on a backbone
of trusted routers, and are therefore unsuitable for our problem.
A common thread for these, and many modern QoS solutions
is the use of packet scheduling at routers. By employing a
fair queuing algorithm at the scheduler, honest network users
are protected from the congestion caused by malicious flows.
Typically, increased precision of a fair queuing algorithm comes
at the cost of increased complexity. Solutions range from the
fine-grained and complex Weighted Fair Queueing (WFQ) [7]
to the course-grained and efficient Deficit Round Robin (DRR)
[8]. FQ-CoDel [9] provides a combined packet scheduler and
active queue management system to prevent the problem of
bufferbloat [10]. Some variant of TCP is typically used by
nodes to adaptively set their packet rate in these networks. In
TCP, nodes additively increase their packet rate until congestion
is detected, at which point they multiplicatively decrease their
packet rate. However, TCP requires some form of feedback
from congested routers, either through acknowledgements [11],
or explicit congestion notifications (ECNs) [12], which make
them unsuitable for our trustless setting.
III. NODE AND NETWORK MODEL
We denote the set of all nodes participating in the net-
work as M. Each node, m ∈ M, has a set of neighbours,
Nm ⊂ M, with which it communicates directly over a secure
bidirectional channel. The data shared by nodes are referred to
as transactions and can include, for example, signed updates of
account balances, or IoT sensor data. A transaction is referred
to as disseminated when it is present in all ledgers. Conversely,
undisseminated transactions are those which have been created,
but are not yet disseminated. The rate at which node i’s trans-
actions are disseminated is denoted Di, and the dissemination
rate of all transactions is denoted D. Dissemination rate can be
thought of as a measure of network throughput in DLTs. D is
bounded, in the long run, by the writing bottleneck at nodes and
will be the primary metric we use to evaluate the performance of
our congestion control algorithm. Figure 1 illustrates the model
of a node, m, and its neighbours. Some of the key notation
for the following section is outlined in Table I. Each node has
an identity and an associated reputation. Examples of reputation
systems which fit our model include reputation directly linked to
a node’s wealth, delegated forms of reputation, such as the mana
system employed in the IOTA network [13], or permissioned
DLTs with an elected consortium of reputable nodes [14]. Node
m’s reputation is denoted repm. The reputation distribution is
assumed to be known by all nodes. Additionally, in this work,
reputation is assumed not to vary with time.
Fig. 1. Model for a node m.
The relevant operations performed on transactions, by
nodes, are: issuing; receiving; forwarding; writing.
A. Issuing Transactions
Transactions are issued and cryptographically signed by
nodes, linking that transaction to the issuer. This means that a
receiving node can identify the node from which any transaction
originates. The rate at which node m issues new transactions is
denoted λm. As we shall describe below, we impose a global
limit, ν, on transaction writing in order to ensure consistency,
and each node is entitled to a minimum fraction of this,
proportional to their reputation. In other words, node m has
an assured rate, λ˜m, defined as:
λ˜m =
ν · repm∑
i∈M repi
. (1)
Note that if all nodes always had transactions to issue, or could
exchange trusted communications, the problem of congestion
control would be trivial: specifically, each node could either set
their issue rate to λm = λ˜m, or coordinate a fair issue rate
with their peers, as in [4]. In reality, many nodes are likely to
be offline at various times, while other nodes have additional
transactions to issue, resulting in under-utilisation of network
resources if a fixed rate were to be used. Thus, in the presence
of varying traffic conditions and a trustless, decentralised envi-
ronment, managing transaction issue rate becomes considerably
more difficult. To capture these varying traffic conditions, we
define four modes of operation for nodes issuing transactions:
leftmargin=1em
• Inactive: Not issuing any transactions i.e. λm = 0.
• Content: Issuing transactions at a fixed rate λm ≤ λ˜m.
This is modelled as Poisson process with rate parameter
λm, which is a standard model for arrival processes.
• Best-effort: Issuing transactions at the highest rate
possible under the current traffic conditions, without
causing excessive congestion. This requires a node to
use the rate setting algorithm, outlined in Section IV,
to utilise unused network resources and adaptively set
λm > λ˜m. We assume that a leaky bucket regulator
with rate λm is employed to achieve the set issue rate
i.e. the rate is deterministic, rather than Poisson.
• Malicious: Issuing transactions at a rate λm  λ˜m,
without concern for the congestion caused. There are
many strategies a malicious node could adopt, depend-
ing on their goal, some of which we shall discuss in
Section V.
Note: The issue rate of a node can be capped to prevent
certain malicious behaviour, such as spamming. The interested
reader can refer to [15] for more details.
B. Receiving and Forwarding Transactions
Nodes receive transactions from their neighbours, and also
forward transactions to their neighbours, as illustrated in Figure
1. Each node maintains an inbox buffer, denoted Inboxm,
which contains transactions received from neighbours and is-
sued by itself. Transactions are filtered before being to added
the inbox, to prevent spam [15]. We denote by Inboxm(i), the
set of transactions issued by node i in m’s inbox buffer. The
size of each buffer is finite, and each node, m, should ensure
that Inboxi(m) at other nodes i ∈ M does not become too
large, as this could lead to excessive queuing delays. We assume
that flooding is employed here for forwarding of transactions,
meaning that all new information is forwarded to all neighbours
(except the source node) without regard for whether or not
neighbours already possess it. Hence, the stream of transactions
from m to i consists of transactions issued by all nodes
(except those received from i itself). We refer to a sequence
of transactions, issued by node i, as i’s flow. Gossip protocols
can be employed in some DLT networks, to reduce forwarding
overhead, but we defer the discussion of such optimisations to
future work.
C. Writing Transactions
When a node is informed of a new transaction, a series of
actions must be taken to add the transaction to the node’s local
copy of the ledger. We refer to these steps as writing, and the
details of what is required to write a transaction will depend on
the underlying ledger structure, and details which are specific
to the DLT implementation. We note that, fundamentally, if a
transaction is to become part of the distributed ledger, it must
be written by every node2. For this reason, we impose a global
transaction writing rate, ν, to ensure consistency. Transactions
from Inboxm are scheduled for writing at a deterministic rate,
ν, by a scheduling algorithm which is described in Section
IV. Transactions are added to a writing buffer after they are
scheduled, so although the time required to write transactions
will vary slightly, nodes must only ensure that a writing rate
of ν can be achieved in the long run to ensure this buffer does
not overflow.
IV. CONGESTION CONTROL ALGORITHM
Our congestion control algorithm seeks to maximise re-
source utilisation, while ensuring that the requirements laid out
in Section I-A, namely consistency, fairness and security, are
2DLTs with sharding are an exception to this rule as each node must only
keep track of relevant shards. Although sharding is beyond the scope of this
work, our solution applies to a single shard.
TABLE I. NOTATION FOR NODE AND NETWORK MODEL.
M set of all nodes in the network
Nm set of all nodes that are neighbours of node m
D total dissemination rate
Di dissemination rate of i’s transactions
ν global transaction writing rate
repm reputation of node m
λm issue rate of node m
λ˜m assured issue rate of node m
met. The two core components of our solution are a scheduling
algorithm and a rate setting algorithm:
Scheduling: The goal of this component is to schedule
transactions, issued by each node i ∈M, at a rate proportional
to repi. In other words, we wish to achieve weighted max-
min fairness [3] in the writing rate across issuing nodes. This
ensures that, for a node m, that issues transactions at an
appropriate rate relative to its reputation, the aforementioned
requirements will be met: namely, m’s transactions will not
become backlogged at any node, so consistency will be ensured;
m’s fair share of the network resources are allocated to it,
guaranteeing fairness; malicious nodes sending above their
allowed rate will not interrupt m’s dissemination rate, fulfilling
the security requirement.
Rate setting: The rate setting component seeks to allow
best-effort nodes (see Section III) to issue at a rate above
their assured rate, λ˜m, without causing excessive congestion
elsewhere, which could cause a violation of the consistency
requirements. We also wish to maintain weighted max-min
fairness among best-effort nodes, so that each node can claim a
portion of the available dissemination rate proportional to their
reputation.
A. Scheduling Algorithm
Nodes in our setting are capable of more complex and
customised behaviour than a typical router in a packet-switched
network, but our scheduler must still be lightweight and scalable
due to the potentially large number of nodes requiring differen-
tiated treatment. It is estimated that over 10,000 nodes operate
on the bitcoin network3, and we expect that an even greater
number of nodes are likely to be present in the IoT setting. For
this reason, we adopt a scheduler based on DRR [8]. The Linux
implementation of the FQ-CoDel packet scheduler, which is
based on DRR, supports anywhere up to 65535 separate queues
[9].
The scheduling algorithm is described in Algorithm 1, and
algorithm parameters are given in Table II. Transactions are
scheduled at a maximum rate ν. Qi is proportional to repi, to
give a weighted share of the scheduler output to nodes, based
on their reputation.
TABLE II. SCHEDULING ALGORITHM PARAMETERS.
DCj(i) deficit counter for transactions in Inboxj(i)
Qi quantum added to DCj(i), ∀j in each round (∝ repi)
3https://bitnodes.io/
Algorithm 1 DRR Scheduler
Repeat for i ∈M in a round robin cycle:
1: if |Inboxm(i)| > 0 then
2: DCm(i)← DCm(i) +Qi
3: if DCm(i) ≥ 1 and then
4: Schedule a transaction from Inboxm(i)
5: DCm(i)← DCm(i)− 1
6: Wait 1ν seconds
7: end if
8: end if
B. Rate Setting Algorithm
If all nodes always had transactions to issue, the problem of
rate setting would be very straightforward: nodes could simply
operate in content mode i.e. at a fixed, assured rate, λ˜m. The
scheduling algorithm ensures that this rate is enforceable, and
that increasing delays or dropped transactions are only experi-
enced by misbehaving node. However, it is highly unlikely that
all nodes will always have transactions to issue, and we would
like best-effort nodes to better utilise network resources, without
causing excessive congestion and violating requirements.
Our rate setting algorithm, for best-effort nodes is inspired
by TCP — each node employs additive increase, multiplicative
decrease (AIMD) rules to update their issue rate in response to
congestion events [16]. However, in the trustless DLT setting,
the traditional means of responding to congestion is compro-
mised. For example, malicious nodes could attempt to deflate
the issue rate of their neighbours by not sending acknowl-
edgements, or sending illegitimate congestion notifications. We
recall, however, that in the case of distributed ledgers, all
transaction traffic passes through all nodes, contrary to the case
of traffic typically found in packet switched networks and other
traditional network architectures. Under these conditions, local
congestion at a node is all that is required to indicate congestion
elsewhere in the network. This observation is crucial, as it
presents an opportunity for a congestion control algorithm based
entirely on local traffic.
Recall that when a node m issues a transaction, it is added
to its inbox buffer to be scheduled. Node m’s own transactions
in its inbox, Inboxm(m), are then scheduled at a rate which
depends on the other traffic present in the buffer. We observe
that the length of Inboxm(m) gives an estimate of congestion
in node m’s traffic, not only at its own inbox buffer, but at
Inboxi(m) for all properly behaving nodes i ∈ M, within
some network network delay.
Algorithm 2 outlines the AIMD rules employed by each
node to set their issue rate, and the parameters of the rate
setting algorithm are outlined in Table III. Each node sets
their own local additive-increase parameter based on the global
increase rate A, and their reputation. An appropriate choice
of A ensures a conservative global increase rate which does
not cause problems even when many nodes increase their rate
simultaneously. Nodes wait τ seconds after a multiplicative
decrease, during which there are no further updates made,
to allow the reduced rate to take effect and prevent multiple
successive decreases. Waiting after decreases is common in
implementations of AIMD algorithms, such as sliding window
flow control in TCP [11]. Rate updates take place each time a
transaction is scheduled i.e. at rate ν during congestion, when
there are always transactions in the inbox. At each update,
node m checks how many of its own transactions are in its
inbox buffer, and responds with a multiplicative decrease if
this number is above a threshold, Lm, which is proportional
to m’s reputation. If the number of transactions in Inboxm(m)
is below the threshold, m’s issue rate is incremented by its local
increase parameter αm.
TABLE III. RATE SETTING ALGORITHM PARAMETERS.
A global additive increase parameter
β global multiplicative decrease parameter
τ wait time parameter
Li inbox length threshold for node i (∝ repi)
Algorithm 2 AIMD Rate Setter (Best-effort Mode)
Initialise node m ∈M:
1: αm ← A · repm/
∑
i∈M repi
Repeat each time a transaction is written (rate ν):
2: if |Inboxm(m)| > Lm then
3: λm ← λm · β
4: Wait τ seconds for next update
5: else
6: λm ← λm + αm
7: end if
V. SIMULATIONS
A simulator was built in Python to test our congestion
control algorithm [17]. All node behaviour described in Section
III is modelled in the simulator, and the algorithm design
considerations that were outlined in Section IV are imple-
mented. Nodes in the simulator share a DAG-based distributed
ledger, as described in Section I. We present results from two
sets of 100 Monte Carlo simulations: the first set with only
non-malicious nodes; and the second set with the addition of
malicious behaviour.
Our test network consists of 15 nodes, arranged in a
random 4-regular graph i.e. each node has 4 random neighbours.
Channel delays are random between 50 ms and 150 ms, and
do not vary over time. We first consider a group of five nodes
in each of the non-malicious modes of operation. Each group
of five nodes has the reputation distribution {3, 2, 1, 1, 1}. We
identify nodes by a letter representing their mode of operation
and a number representing their reputation. For example, if a
node is denoted B2, this is a best-effort node with reputation
2. Simulations begin at time t = 0. Content nodes, in these
simulations, issue at their full assured rate λi = λ˜i. Best-
effort nodes begin the simulation issuing at their assured rate,
and start to increase their rate, with the rate setting algorithm,
after 10 seconds of the simulation. The parameters used for the
congestion control algorithm are given in Table IV.
TABLE IV. CONGESTION CONTROL PARAMETERS.
Scheduler Rate Setter
ν Qi A β τ Li
10 repi 0.1 0.5 2 2 · repi
Figure 2 shows: the dissemination rate of each node; the
dissemination rate, scaled by assured issue rate, of each node;
and the number of undisseminated transactions for each node.
The dissemination rate plots reveal that fairness is achieved,
and that the unutilised network resources are fairly distributed
among the best-effort nodes. The content nodes’ rates converge
to their assured issue rate, as expected, and as each group has
equal reputation, the best effort nodes converge to twice their as-
sured rate, consuming the unused resources left by the inactive
nodes. The plot of undisseminated transactions demonstrates
consistency, because the protocol drops no transactions, and
the number of undisseminated transactions remains bounded.
Figure 3 shows that the overall dissemination rate approaches
the maximum writing rate of nodes, and the mean delay remains
bounded. Although counter intuitive, the dissemination rate
often exceeds the maximum writing rate of nodes ν because,
although transactions must pass through every node, they have
different start and end points. Figure 4 demonstrates that delays
are kept low.
Fig. 2. Simulation set 1: dissemination rate, scaled dissemination rate, and
number of undisseminated transactions over time (moving average over a ten
second window).
Fig. 3. Simulation set 1: dissemination rate (moving average over a ten second
window) and mean transaction delay.
Fig. 4. Simulations set 1: CDF of transaction latency.
The remaining requirement to test is security. In the second
set of simulations, one of the B1 nodes is switched from best-
effort mode to malicious mode. Specifically, this node issues
transactions at 5 times its assured rate. All other simulation
parameters remain unchanged. Figure 5 shows that the dissem-
ination rate of the malicious node is very slightly higher than
that of the best-effort nodes. However, the number of undissem-
inated transactions issued by the malicious node is constantly
growing, as a result of large backlogs in its transactions in the
buffers of non-malicious nodes. Excessively full inbox buffers
are therefore a simple means of detecting malicious behaviour,
and action can be taken to remove the malicious node from
the network. Dealing with detected attackers is implementation-
specific and beyond the scope of this work, but will be a subject
of future work. Additionally, Figure 6 shows that the malicious
node only delays its own transactions. This set of simulations
shows that a malicious actor can not violate the requirements
of fairness and consistency, as this type of malicious behaviour
is easily detectable. In other words, the security requirement is
also satisfied.
Fig. 5. Simulation set 2: dissemination rate, scaled dissemination rate, and
number of undisseminated transactions over time (moving average over a ten
second window).
Fig. 6. Simulation set 2: CDF of transaction latency.
Initial results show that our algorithm is robust with respect
to different network conditions and algorithm parameters. Fu-
ture publications will report a detailed sensitivity analysis.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a congestion control algorithm for DLTs
that utilises node resources optimally and minimises delay,
satisfying the requirements of fairness, consistency and security.
We have evaluated its performance with extensive Monte Carlo
analysis using a detailed agent-based Python simulator. Future
lines of research will address a broader range of simulation
scenarios, as well as deployment of our algorithm on a DLT test
network, such as the IOTA Foundation’s GoShimmer network
[18].
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